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Abstract 
Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area is retrenching at a quicker pace 
than outside the union. Home bias persists: Governments compete on funding costs by 
supporting ‘their’ banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feeds 
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the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. This paper 
discusses the theoretical foundations of a banking union in a common currency area and the 
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CEPS Working Document No. 389 / February 2014 
1. Introduction 
If bank resolution is never an easy task, the additional layers of interaction within the 
financial system in Europe, its legal rules and the relevant governing bodies make this 
matter even more complicated. The nexus of interests, as well as the legal and economic 
barriers that affect management and operations, has been slowing down the restructuring of 
the banking sector and has hindered proper management of troubled assets that are a legacy 
of the financial crisis. This complicates discussions on how best to devise a mechanism for 
orderly bank resolution and burden sharing. As European institutions strive to strike the 
proper balance on burden sharing between countries in developing a fully fledged European 
resolution framework, the breadth and depth of the new mechanism for bank resolution is 
affected by several factors, such as the impact of the currency union that is discussed in this 
paper. A main point of conflict is the extent to which national governments ought to be 
allowed to bail out national banks and concurrently how much creditors and depositors of 
the bank ought to be subject to compulsory ‘bail-in’ procedures in the recapitalisation 
process. Complexity in the negotiations has been growing, as European institutions try to 
make this reform match other pieces of the banking union puzzle, such as the creation of a 
common supervisory mechanism, which would centralise supervision of systemically 
important banks under the European Central Bank, and the creation of a common deposit 
guarantee scheme to replace those that today in countries like Italy and Spain rely solely on 
unfunded government guarantees. All these proposals aim to shield the financial system 
from the adverse effects of another systemic crisis and potential runs on banks by providing 
an appropriate supervisory mechanism and safeguards to ensure that the banking system 
functions on an equal footing for all banks involved in the process, minimising the 
involvement of taxpayers’ money. Such a common system would also revive the cross-
border market for banks’ mergers and acquisitions. 
2. The banking system and financial fragmentation 
Although the financial crisis badly hit European banks, the banking system has barely 
embarked on the restructuring process, particularly in the euro area. Reasons for the delay 
are manifold, but a fundamental cause is the key role of banks in the funding of European 
economies, both at the periphery and within the core. Their mammoth size and their 
interconnections, not just among themselves but also with national political establishments 
and local constituencies, tie their fate closely to their domestic governments. This ‘fatal hug’ 
between governments and banks has materialised most prominently in two ways:  
                                                   
* Ph.D., Head of Capital Markets Research at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). The 
author is solely responsible for any errors. He gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments from 
Thorsten Beck, Steven Greenfield, Daniel Gros, Karel Lannoo and Willem Pieter De Groen. 
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 Banks’ use of central banks’ ‘cheap’ liquidity for massive purchases of domestic 
government bonds, in spite of attempts by the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
transfer the impulse of monetary policy to the economy via bank lending (Merler and 
Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Valiante, 2012b; EBA, 2013). 
 The fast retrenching of banks’ international diversification when the financial crisis 
hit, despite deep financial integration in the European Monetary Union (EMU) (so-
called ‘home bias’; see Manna, 2011; Valiante, 2012b; Liikanen Report, 2012).  
The former development was spurred by incentives to increase concentration of domestic 
government bonds holding, so indirectly calling for massive government intervention 
(through guarantees and liquidity injections) to limit the repercussions of banks’ difficulties 
on each other’s financial situations. The carry trade between the ECB liquidity injection and 
the higher ‘safe’ return on government bonds has helped national governments sustain 
public finances in a time of deep liquidity crises. The latter outcome is a more general trend 
caused by frictions in the financial system and in particular cross-border transactions in the 
common currency area (see the next section). Specifically, cross-border asset holdings have 
been decreasing since the beginning of the financial crisis, and that tendency accelerated 
when the sovereign crisis spread (see Figure 1). Cross-border securities holdings, most 
notably, have diminished by more than 30% after reaching a historical peak in 2008. 
Figure 1. Intra-EMU monetary financial 
institutions’ euro-area holdings, 2006–13 
(€ mn) 
 
Figure 2. Intra versus Extra-EMU (EU) and other 
extra EMU (selected) outstanding loans and 
securities other than shares or foreign claims (€ mn), 
∆ Q2-2010/Q3-2013  
 
 
Note: Up to November 2013. 
Source: ECB.  
 
Note: loans and securities holdings of EMU MFIs versus MFIs and 
non-MFIs counterparties.  ‘Selected’ extra EMU countries are 
foreign claims of domestic banks in France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain versus Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR, 
Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States.1  
Sources: ECB and BIS. 
As the sovereign crisis expanded, the retrogression of financial integration in the euro area 
accelerated compared with claims against other major areas of the world. Claims of EMU 
banks versus those of other EMU countries dropped by almost €1 trillion (or 23%), while 
                                                   
1 Bank for International Settlements data converted to euros with a simple average of yearly exchange 
rates from 2010 to 2013 calculated by www.oanda.com/currency/average. For a definition of ‘foreign 
claims’, see the BIS Glossary (www.bis.org/statistics/bankstatsguide_glossary.pdf).  
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claims of EMU banks vis-à-vis other European counterparties dropped by a lesser amount. 
Moreover, foreign claims of banks in the four biggest EMU economies (France, Spain, 
Germany and Italy) versus counterparties in selected non-EMU economies only dropped by 
10% since the second quarter of 2010, while intra-EMU claims for these countries dropped by 
more than 15% during the same period (see Figure 2 and Figure A1 in the annex). While 
financial integration and freedom of capital movement should protect the financial system 
from extreme bias in favour of domestic institutions, idiosyncrasies specific to the monetary 
union have instead accelerated financial fragmentation compared with other areas of the 
world (see the following section). As a result, home bias persists despite early signs of 
recovery. The UK, US and Japan have seen a much lower drop in the foreign claims of 
domestic banks since the inception of the sovereign crisis. For the US and Japan, foreign 
claims of domestic banks versus the rest of the world have significantly increased since 2005 
and have only marginally dropped versus euro-area counterparties since the beginning of 
the sovereign crisis in the second quarter of 2010 (see Figures A2 and A3 in the annex). 
Furthermore, the cross-border interbank market for banks in some euro-area countries 
remains frozen, and distrust among euro-area financial institutions continues. Cross-border 
loans to other EMU monetary financial institutions (MFIs)2 and MFIs’ deposits have been 
experiencing a steady drop since the beginning of the financial crisis, which then accelerated 
with the sovereign crisis later on (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Intra-EMU MFIs’ loans to other MFIs and MFIs’ deposits (€ mn), 2006–13 
 
Note: Up to November 2013.  
Source: ECB. 
Since 2008, with an acceleration in 2010, differences among the euro-area regions emerged 
also in relation to MFIs’ cross-border securities holdings, as ring-fencing at national level 
                                                   
2 According to the ECB Glossary, ‘Monetary Financial Institutions’ are “resident credit institutions (as 
defined in EU law) and all other resident financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits 
and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs and, for their own account (at least 
in economic terms), to grant credit and/or invest in securities. The latter group consists 
predominantly of money market funds.” The full definition is available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossm.en.html#447. 
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(home bias) for the sake of liquidity led to a significant drop of holdings of MFI and non-MFI 
in securities of counterparties located in peripheral countries such as Spain, Ireland and Italy. 
In countries such as Belgium, Germany and Netherlands, considered to be at the core of the 
eurozone, cross-border MFIs’ holdings of local counterparties’ securities remained at a stable 
level (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Intra-EMU monetary financial institutions’ (a) and non-MFIs’ (b) cross-border securities 
holdings (€ mn), by country, 2003–13 
(a) (b) 
  
Note: Securities holdings by nationality of the counterpart. ‘NLBEDE’ stands for the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany; ‘ESITIR’, for Spain, Italy and  Ireland. 
Source: ECB. 
Since the inception of the sovereign crisis, therefore, liquidity ring-fencing has been 
fragmenting the financial system of the euro area along country lines. Most notably, on top 
of precarious market conditions, which also affect non-euro-area countries, the following 
policies and practices have boosted risk aversion (home bias), particularly in the eurozone:  
1. Regulatory capital requirements; 
2. National resolution mechanisms; 
3. Governance and political interference; and 
4. Common currency and payment system (infrastructure). 
First, the purchase of domestic government bonds in the eurozone by local banks is strongly 
encouraged by the opportunity to count government bonds as ‘risk-free assets’ under the 
risk-weighting provisions of current capital requirements, even for those bond issuers that 
are not backed by a currency printer anymore (such as countries in the euro area). These 
rules come on top of a carry trade created by the ECB’s cheap liquidity injections (so-called 
‘Long-Term Refinancing Operations’), in particular from early 2012 onward.  
Second, the absence of ‘bail-in’ procedures and homogeneous national resolution 
mechanisms for banks, equipped with a credible (i.e., sizeable and funded) resolution fund, 
has fuelled banks’ risk aversion (Manna, 2011). Uncertainty regarding who would bear the 
costs of the resolution of financial institutions that have in the meantime built strong cross-
border interests thanks to the high financial integration of the euro area has played an 
important role in fuelling liquidity ring-fencing at the national level. Moreover, the sharp 
increase in banks’ domestic holdings could increase pressure for a pre-emptive government 
intervention to avoid a disorderly liquidation that would ultimately have repercussions on 
governments’ own funding resources (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). Since 2010, as suggested by 
Figure 5, a more than €200 billion drop in financial institutions’ holdings of securities issued 
by foreign governments has been offset by an increase of roughly €500 billion in holdings of 
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domestic government securities, on top of the increase in other domestic assets precipitated 
by home bias. 
Figure 5. Securities other than shares, non-domestic (a) versus domestic (b) holdings (€ mn), 
2007– 13 
(a) (b) 
  
Note: Up to November 2013. 
Source: ECB. 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, this bad mix of incentives has prompted the G-20 to 
issue a statement about the need to have more effective crisis management rules for banks.3 
The discussion of common rules in the EU is still under way, after a first draft proposal was 
released in June 2012, but it will rely on how fast and accurately governments will transpose 
the current EU Directive into national law.4  
Third, banks’ management in many EU countries has over the years cultivated a tight 
relationship with the political establishment and local constituencies, mainly through no-
profit legal entities such as foundations (for instance, the Cajas in Spain or the Landesbanken 
in Germany; see, among others, Garicano, 2012). These relationships with the political 
establishment contribute to delaying reforms that can sensibly reduce systemic risk yet also 
hurt profitability for banks’ shareholders in the short term.  
Finally, and perhaps most important, in some European countries, the existence of a single 
currency and payment infrastructure has removed barriers to the circulation of capital and 
introduced an exogenous constraint on governments’ ability to borrow funds and affected 
the links with domestic banks that are main buyers or intermediaries for buyers of 
government bonds. The following section will discuss the implications of the common 
currency on the nature of a banking union. 
3. The common currency dimension  
With the introduction of the common currency, capital (savings) across euro-area countries 
can move freely, and investors can quickly exchange cross-border investments in the same 
                                                   
3 See G-20 Conclusions in Washington 2008 
(www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html#risk) and London 2009 
(www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html). 
4 See more on the Commission’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/).  
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asset class, for instance, from Spanish government bonds to German ones when risk aversion 
increases (Kopf, 2011). Because fiscal policies and backstops are national, governments 
behave strategically to avoid instability in the banking system that would result in capital 
shifting toward safer banking systems within the same currency area, causing a sharp 
increase in their own borrowing costs. Fear of capital flight and of a quick polarisation of the 
eurozone banking system (via savings transfers) toward countries endowed with greater 
fiscal capacity motivates these interventions. In addition, imposing the losses of domestic 
banks on creditors, including international investors and local government debt holders, 
might provoke a sell-off that could involve domestic government bonds, thus leading to a 
jump in refinancing costs. As a result, the use of fiscal power to prop up domestic banking 
systems in the Eurozone has served the purpose of ring-fencing liquidity at national level, 
ultimately delaying a much-needed restructuring of the sector.  
This fear, however, is typical of a currency union while less significant for countries that do 
not share a common currency for at least two reasons: the intrinsic legal and economic 
barriers raised by a different currency, and the financial backstop that the domestic central 
bank can offer in case the government runs out of money. Eurozone governments’ 
creditworthiness is therefore priced by financial markets according to their actual fiscal 
capacity, taking into account the lack of a central bank backstop, which by statute cannot 
come from the ECB. The delay in the restructuring of domestic banking systems has also put 
off proper management of losses from ‘legacy’ assets (banks’ troubled or impaired loans). 
Frictions in the banking system have further slowed down the creation of a single market for 
banks’ control, despite the low market capitalisation that several banks have today.5 Despite 
greater financial integration, cross-border equity ownership of banks is still limited and has 
only somewhat increased since the introduction of the common currency. Additional 
underlying legal and fiscal barriers still hamper equity market integration.  
The moral hazard governments incur in putting off to their successors the restructuring of 
the banking system to avoid repercussions on their borrowing costs resembles what 
happened in Japan after the incredible growth of its banking sector during the 1970s, when 
the national economy was still fairly closed. After the country gradually opened up, the 
delay in restructuring banks and corporations in the country, driven by the interference of 
public policies, substantially contributed to its stagnation over the years. These tensions 
depressed the economy by distorting the proper channelling of credit into the economy or 
diverting it toward underperforming sectors (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004; 2011). The Japanese 
experience offers lessons about the importance of a flexible financial system in an open 
economy, through, for instance, solid resolution procedures that allow restructuring (and 
liquidation) of banks when they suffer losses caused by a prolonged downturn in the 
business cycle.  
Furthermore, fragmentation in the banking system can generate negative spillover for credit 
markets, with significant welfare losses in particular for the economies in a currency union. 
As Bignon, Breton and Rojas Breu (2013) suggest, a currency union without smoothly 
functioning credit markets aggravates issues of adverse selection because of the difficulty 
banks encounter getting cross-border information on borrowers or discounting the costs of 
different bankruptcy laws. Most notably, this situation can ultimately magnify welfare losses 
for EMU citizens compared to non-EMU ones thanks to fear of savings flight. The lack of 
enforcement mechanisms for cross-border debt repayment is one of the frictions in the 
working of the credit system. Conflicting bankruptcy laws or government interventions to 
                                                   
5 The three top Italian banks (by assets) had a total market capitalisation of €58.8 bn on 16 December 
2013. 
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protect local banks lead good borrowers to borrow domestically because of the implicit 
guarantees that offset potential lower costs of cross-border services (home bias). As a result, 
a fragmented banking system can impose higher welfare losses in a common currency area 
because capital can easily move in good times but might not be easily disinvested when a 
crisis looms. Prolonged inability to resolve these problems in the credit market may thus 
have unpredictable effects on the stability of the euro area.  
3.1 The banking system in the eurozone 
The banking system in the eurozone has shown flexibility during the growth phase of 
business cycle but, as with Japan, it remains sticky in the negative adjustment phase, when 
losses need to be absorbed by the system. As discussed above, assets that are the legacy of a 
financial crisis can hamper governments’ ability to raise money and so postpone the 
absorption of losses by the financial system. Evidence in the euro area corroborates these 
findings. While monetary financial institutions shrink in number partially because of the 
historical up-scaling trend of the European banking system to a single-market dimension 
and the shutdown of several money market funds, the size of total assets is still above pre-
crisis levels (see Figure 6). By considering only credit institutions, findings do not change. 
However, the reduction of the asset side may not necessarily be a measure of the on-going 
restructuring of the sector and the write-offs; it can also reflect an attempt to prop up banks’ 
balance sheets by reducing size and thus limiting equity dilution. 
Figure 6. EMU banks’ total assets (€ mn) and number of monetary financial institutions 
(outstanding), 1999–2013 
 
Note: From January 1999 until October 2013. The progressive entry of new countries in 2008 and 2009 (Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovakia) has caused jumps in the MFI series over time, as new entities were added to the sample. 
However, due to the limited size of these banking systems, the impact on the series and the analysis is negligible. 
Source: ECB. 
The initial drop in the total number of MFIs and the stabilisation of total assets growth is 
slowly reversing the pre-crisis trend. However, the adjustment process still requires dealing 
with legacy losses, so necessitating a widespread restructuring of banks’ balance sheets 
(Acharya and Steffen, 2014). Although the regulatory reserve capital of EMU banks has been 
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constantly increasing since 2008, the rise in non-performing loans and their systemic risk 
may compel banks to continue efforts to dilute their equity (EBA, 2013; Acharya and Steffen, 
2014).6 
Significantly, the adjustment process appears uneven across euro-area countries, calling into 
question what really drives financial integration in the banking system. As Figure 7 suggests, 
banks’ total assets over gross domestic product (GDP) have greatly diminished in countries 
where restructuring was imposed by external intervention such as through the European 
Stability Mechanism, as in the case of Ireland (around 600% of GDP) and most recently Spain 
(around 300%), or by financial firm bankruptcies, as for Belgium’s Dexia and Fortis. In either 
case, interventions were forced by the inability of both public and private sectors to raise 
money directly. The size of the banking sector has remained stable or is relatively bigger in 
euro-area countries where banks or governments have been able so far to source capital, 
such as France and Germany, on top of the credit relief provided by the ECB Long Term 
Refinancing Operations. This also occurred for countries with well-known problems with 
non-performing loans, such as Italy. 
Figure 7. Banks’ total assets over GDP in selected countries (xtimes), 2007–13  
 
Source: ECB and IMF (annual GDP data).  
Negative GDP growth in some countries, such as Spain, has contributed to keep this ratio 
stable. In Italy, for instance, the private sector has been able so far to avoid hard 
restructuring decisions, raising capital from the country’s abundant private savings and to 
less extent than other countries from public support. The German (in absolute terms) and 
French banking systems are also a bigger part of the economy than their pre-crisis levels, 
despite significant issues with legacy losses during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Massive 
government interventions to subsidise the banking system in these two countries have been 
                                                   
6 For a deeper analysis of the systemic risk of EMU financial institutions, see the New York University 
Volatility Institute at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu. Standard & Poor’s has recently estimated a capital 
shortfall of €110 billion for Western European banks; see www.scribd.com/doc/191086580/Untitled. 
For a recap of recent estimates, see also S. Merler and G.B. Wolff, “Ending uncertainty: 
Recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 
2013/18, Bruegel, December 2013. 
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critical in delaying restructuring. The United Kingdom’s banks have undergone some 
measure of restructuring as a result of the financial crisis since limited interventions to 
recapitalise banks with limited conditions were pursued, rather nationalisations and hard 
restructuring. Although bank assets size overall is close to pre-crisis levels, the volatility 
displayed by the country’s total bank assets in recent years is perhaps the effect of on-going 
restructuring.  
3.2 Governments and moral hazard 
Direct government intervention to offer guarantees or asset relief or to recapitalise banks in 
the European Union, especially in the euro area, has been approved under state assistance 
rules for significant amounts, as shown in Table 1. State aids were approved under the 
exceptional circumstances of Article 107.3.b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU),7 which allows aid to be used “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State”, with conditions that have been gradually tightened as the crisis eased. In 
some countries, such as Ireland and Spain, external public funding sources, for instance, the 
new European Stability Mechanism, have provided support to governments tied to 
additional conditions beyond that of the state aids framework of Article 107 that apply to the 
government (generally called, ‘structural reforms’). More than 75% of all state assistance 
(around €4 trillion) from 2008 to 2012 in the European Union has been used by euro-area 
countries, which have on average provided more state aids to local banks than the rest of the 
European Union and perhaps the rest of the world. 
Table 1. State assistance in selected countries (by total state aids; € bn), total 2008–12 
 State aid Recapitalisation 
Total state aid 
as a percentage of 
banks’ assets 
Recapitalisation 
as a percentage 
of banks’ assets 
Type 
Ireland 920.92 62.78 62.43% 4.26% Government/ 
ESM/EFSF/Troika 
UK 693.77 82.39 7.52% 0.89% Government 
Germany 483.37 64.17 6.00% 0.80% Government 
Spain 371.36 59.74 10.59% 1.70% Government/ESM 
France 344.28 25.05 4.34% 0.32% Government 
Netherlands 211.07 18.86 9.08% 0.81% Government 
Belgium 201.16 23.32 17.18% 1.99% Government 
Italy 102.63 6.05 2.63% 0.15% Government 
Total EMU 2,999.23 318.49 9.29% 0.99% - 
Total extra-
EMU 968.12 94.71 7.79% 0.76% - 
Total EU-27 3,967.35 413.2 8.87% 0.71% - 
 
Note: State aids include recapitalisation, asset relief, guarantees and other liquidity-boosting measures. The value of 
guarantees is the cumulative sum of yearly amounts renewed on a six-month basis. 
Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Competition and ECB. 
                                                   
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part 3: Union policies and internal actions, Title 7: 
Common rules on competition, taxation and approximation of laws, Chapter 1: Rules on competition, 
Section 2: Aids granted by states – Article 107 (ex Article 87 TEC). 
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EMU countries thus have been using their fiscal capacity to support the domestic banking 
system, in particular before the European Commission’s rules on state aids  were further 
tightened in July 2013 with the forced ‘bail-in’ of bank owners and junior creditors.8 State 
assistance rules have been mostly used for guarantees, which required fewer conditions, 
such as no restructuring plan, than those requested for the recapitalisation of banks with 
public money. Guarantees have allowed and still allow governments to subsidise national 
banks’ issuance of credit or borrowing in the interbank market with limited conditions (a fee, 
under the formula set by the Commission’s 2011 Prolongation Communication, and a 
viability review of the bank’s business model, if total outstanding guarantees are higher than 
5% of total liabilities). From July 2013 only, a restructuring plan must be also submitted if 
guarantees exceed either the specified ratio of 5% or €500 million. As a result, trillions of 
euros in guarantees have been used to support the borrowing activities of domestic banks, 
ultimately distorting the pricing of their credit risk and increasing liquidity fragmentation 
along national lines and so frictions to the smooth functioning of the common credit market. 
Notwithstanding the importance of a robust state aids framework in the European Union to 
protect the single market, with strict conditionality to limit banks’ risk-taking behaviours, the 
above-mentioned rules can only partly deal with moral hazard of banks and are certainly 
unable to deal with moral hazard of governments that use their fiscal power to support 
artificial credit market dynamics to avoid repercussions on borrowing costs. Notably, in 
countries where the banking system has been subsidised through government intervention, 
the reinforcement of local banks via capital increases (equity dilution) has made fairly 
modest progress, beyond the ‘natural’ gap caused by different national definitions of capital 
and loan provisions (see Figure 8; see also De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). 
This divergence becomes more evident in looking at the annual marginal increase in capital 
and reserves as a proportion of total capital and reserves vis-à-vis the euro-area average, a 
calculation that partially neutralises the differences in the definition of capital among 
countries. Spain and Ireland, driven by the strict conditions imposed by EU intervention, 
have been the only two countries that had an increase of equity above the euro-area average 
in five out of the past seven years. While the UK has experienced a marginal increase higher 
than the euro-area average in our out of seven years, as illustrated by Figure 9, countries 
where direct or indirect government intervention took place have performed worse in the 
recapitalisation of banks, in particular, Germany, France and Italy (just slightly above 
average for three years out of seven) or Belgium and the Netherlands (only two years above 
the euro-area average, with high volatility in the flow of funds toward recapitalisation). This 
might be a sign that only limited restructuring of the domestic banking system has taken 
place in recent years, despite banks strengthening their regulatory capital reserves across 
Europe. Only Ireland and more recently Spain have implemented or are implementing plans 
to restructure the domestic banking system to a degree that is unprecedented elsewhere. 
 
                                                   
8 See European Commission, Communication COM (2013) 216/01, entered into force on 1 August. 
This communication embodies the six communications of the Commission on state aids to the 
financial system (so-called Crisis Communications). These six communications are: the Banking 
Communication COM (2008) 270; Recapitalisation Communication COM (2009) 10; Impaired Asset 
Communication COM (2009) 72; Restructuring Communication COM (2009) 195; 2010 Prolongation 
Communication COM (2010) 329; 2011 Prolongation Communication COM (2011) 356. 
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Figure 8. Capital and reserves (% of total assets), 2007–13 
 
Source: ECB and IMF (GDP data). 
Figure 9. Capital plus reserves, marginal increase as a percentage of total vs euro-area average, 
2007–13 
 
Source: ECB.  
Note: Annual average of monthly marginal increases. 2013 data are up through October. 
Banks in the euro area that have been able to benefit from the credit status of the local 
government have experienced a slowdown in equity dilution, a delay in restructuring and 
recapitalisation and hence additional losses incurred on legacy assets. Countries where 
restructuring/recapitalisation was imposed by external funding conditions (European 
Stability Mechanism or other financing arrangements) or prompted by the fear of being 
forced to conduct a hard restructuring under external funding arrangements have seen a 
sharper increase in capital held by domestic banks. This divergence is relevant for euro-area 
countries, as non-euro-area countries like the UK and the US have been more active in 
restructuring their financial sectors. Finally, as banks in some countries choose continued 
reliance on the national fiscal backstop over restructuring/recapitalisation, the European 
continental banking system is gradually polarising, with those countries boasting greater 
fiscal capacity serving as the primary destination of capital flight from peripheral countries. 
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As the health of the domestic banking system may affect governments’ borrowing costs, 
public interference in the banking sector thus promote liquidity ring-fencing at national level 
as a way for governments to protect themselves from an acceleration in capital flights toward 
the countries with greater fiscal capacity. This situation increases the likelihood that citizens’ 
welfare in the currency union will be undermined, driving the union into uncertain 
circumstances. 
4. Banking union revisited 
Banking union reforms in the EU in recent years are perhaps the most important 
achievements stemming from the introduction of the common currency, but these reforms 
still lack a solid theoretical framework. The coordination problem among member states, 
which can be framed under the prisoner’s dilemma (Valiante, 2012a), has led so far to sub-
optimal responses to the problem of banks’ legacy assets. In this respect, a theoretical 
framework for the banking union needs to take into account the role of the single currency in 
shaping these incentives, on top of the standard market failures that are inherent in banking. 
As a consequence, banking union in the single currency area faces three potential market 
failures: risk-taking behaviour; depositors’ runs on banks and financial disintegration (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. Banking union revisited  
Failures Causes Effects Behaviour EU remedies EU dimension 
Risk-taking 
behaviour Public guarantees Asset bubbles Banks’ moral hazard  SRM and SSM 
Single 
market 
Run on banks Lack of confidence Liquidity dry-up/insolvency 
Avoiding losses on 
deposits SRM and DGS 
Single 
market 
Postponing 
absorption of 
legacy losses  
Capital flights Financial disintegration  Governments’ moral hazard  
SRM 
(common 
unlimited backstop 
to SRF and no state 
aids clause) 
Common 
currency 
Note: SRM (Single Resolution Mechanism) also includes ‘bail-in’ procedures. “DGS” and “SSM” stand for 
“Deposit Guarantee Scheme” and “Single Supervisory Mechanism”. 
Source: Author. 
While risk-taking behaviours and runs on banks are universal market failures when dealing 
with the economics of banking and money (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Akerlof and Romer, 
1993; Stiglitz, 1993), financial disintegration driven by the moral hazard of governments that 
compete on their own funding is a market failure caused by the common currency 
framework. In a common financial system, a public (supranational) intervention is needed to 
ensure that the location of the bank (and not its assets)9 does not affect its borrowing costs 
and the funding costs of the government where it is legally headquartered.  
In this respect, a tout court prohibition of state aids, which produce distortions and 
destabilise the common financial system, would protect the system from governments’ moral 
hazard. However, such a prohibition would not be credible without a common financial 
backstop, which would assess the need for recapitalisation/resolution of a bank, taking into 
account financial stability concerns in the common currency area, i.e. the actual perimeter of 
                                                   
9 The quality of the assets will always be affected by the economic conditions of the economy in which 
they are located. For instance, real estate assets in Spain shall be affected by the asset bubble in the 
country to the same extent whether the owner is a Spanish or a foreign bank. 
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the financial system. The common financial backstop to a fund privately financed by banks 
with ex ante and ex post levies, plus ‘bail-in’ procedures and the concomitant partial 
mutualisation of losses (to deal with banks’ moral hazard), would not be sound if a national 
government were to retain the option of providing its own funding in an extreme situation 
where the resources of the banks’ collective fund and other levies on banks were exhausted, 
before or after the recapitalisation/resolution mechanism kicks in. If that situation were 
possible, even with a formal ex ante state aids prohibition, markets would be still pricing in 
the status of the domestic banking system in a government’s funding costs and thus 
distorting borrowing costs for domestic versus non-domestic banks.  
As a consequence, the common backstop to a privately sourced bank fund is credible if the 
only resources available after the exhaustion of the fund in extreme situations come from a 
common intervention that does not discriminate based on the nationality of the bank. In 
order to counter the risk of a bank run by depositors, the size of the backstop in other 
countries like the US is formally limited, but de facto unlimited, as national treasuries can 
actually request central bank money when all the bail-in, restructuring and liquidation 
procedures have been put in place but have been insufficient to stop the panic. A careful 
institutional design of the common backstop leaves EU institutions with multiple options, 
such as access to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other common institution 
that can ultimately resort to unrestricted funding, if private or public resources raised from 
open markets are insufficient. Whether through supranational debt issuance or ECB credit 
lines, the potentially unlimited funding of a European resolution mechanism renders 
irrelevant the nationality of taxpayers vis-à-vis the credit risk of their country’s banks. 
4.1 Brief chronicle of the European action plan 
Although the ECB will soon take over supervision of most of European banks, not much can 
practically be done today at the European or euro-area level to recapitalise (with strict 
conditionality in place) or to resolve euro-area banks without the intermediation of national 
governments and political establishments, which are often deeply involved in the 
governance of their own banks. The chronicle of European collective actions is fairly short, 
and only recently has awareness increased about the importance of a banking union for the 
financial system of the euro area. Since the inception of the financial crisis in 2008, the 
European Commission has been active in putting forward new proposals to reform the 
banking system, as a follow-up to G-20 common resolutions and as necessary revisions of 
outdated legislative texts. However, a first set of guidelines on how to create a banking 
union was issued only at the end of June 2012, with the first ‘Four Presidents’ Report10 (EU 
Council, 2012a), followed by a more detailed communication of the Commission in 
September (European Commission, 2012b). The communication was followed by a proposal 
for a single supervisor for European banks (via two regulations) and the idea to have a 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) to complement common resolution procedures 
proposed earlier via directive (6 June 2012), as a follow up to a G-20 commitment on crisis 
management (European Commission, 2012a). A single resolution authority at the European 
level, however, was suggested only in December 2012, by the second ‘Four Presidents’ 
report, to be implemented “once the directive on resolution is approved” (European Council, 
2012b). While waiting for the directive on resolution to be approved, a severe banking crisis 
broke out in Cyprus in March 2013, triggering a disorderly EU intervention that ultimately 
involved the bail-in of depositors. After staggering discretionary decisions caused by the 
                                                   
10 The ‘four presidents’ are those of the ECB, the European Council, the European Commission and 
the Eurogroup. 
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unprecedented situation, which fuelled uncertainty about the stability of the financial system 
and its institutions in the euro area, the fear that Cyprus could wreak havoc on financial 
markets and on the borrowing costs of banks and governments accelerated negotiations for 
the creation of an SRM. On 10 July 2013, the European Commission finally presented a 
proposal for the institution of Single Resolution Board (SRB), to govern the resolution of 
banks in EU member states that will take part in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).  
Table 3. Key European policy actions for a banking union 
EU Action Date of the proposal Objectives Tools Legal basis Mandate Status 
State aids 
framework Since 2008 
Competition in the 
single market 
Communications 
(supervision)11 
Art. 
107.3(b) 
TFEU 
EU Treaties 
(independent) Ongoing 
Deposit 
Guarantee 
Scheme (DGS) 
15 October 
2008 
Harmonised 
threshold Directive 
Art. 40.2 
TEU 
European 
Council12 
Approved  
(March 2009)
12 July 2010 Harmonised procedures Directive 
Art. 114 
TFEU 
European 
Council13 
Under 
approval 
Capital 
Requirements 
(CRD IV) 
20 July 2011 Greater resilience of banks to shocks 
Regulation and 
Directive 
Art. 114 
TFEU 
G-2014 
European 
Council15 
Approved  
(July 2013) 
Banks 
Recovery and 
Resolution 
Directive 
(BRRD) 
6 June 2012 Common crisis management Directive 
Art. 114 
TFEU G-20
16  Under approval 
Under Banking Union mandate 
Single 
Supervisory 
Mechanism 
(SSM) 
12 September 
2012 
Common 
supervision Two Regulations 
Art. 127.6 
TFEU 
European 
Council17 
Approved 
(October 
2013) 
Single 
Resolution 
Mechanism 
(SRM) 
10 July 2013 Common resolution authority/fund Regulation 
Art. 114 
TFEU 
European 
Council18 
Under 
approval 
                                                   
11  European Commission, Communication COM (2013) 216/01, op cit. 
12 EU Finance Ministers meeting on 7 October 2008; see 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/article13219_en.htm. 
13 Ibid. 
14 G-20 Conclusions in Washington, 2008, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html#risk, and London, 2009, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html. 
15 See the conclusions of the European Council on the establishment of a “Single Rulebook” on 18/19 
June 2009, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf. 
16 G-20 Conclusions in Washington, 2008, and London, 2009, op. cit. 
17 After the informal EU Council of 23 May 2012, Council President Herman Van Rompuy issued a 
press release talking about a “more integrated supervision and resolution” and directing the ‘Four 
Presidents’ to produce a report to flesh out more details; see the press release, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/130376.pdf. 
18 See European Council (2012b). 
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As indicated by Table 3, the two major pieces of the banking union (SRM and SSM) were 
proposed only in the past year and a half, as a result of a growing understanding that lack of 
unity in dealing with issues in the banking system could cause much pain to European 
economies. Because of the sharply delineated boundaries of current treaties and political 
pressures by the European Parliament to limit inter-governmental agreements, due to a lack 
of democratic legitimacy, the inability to frame banking union primarily as a euro-area issue 
has affected the ability of EU policy-makers to address financial stability concerns in the 
banking system.19 Despite the bold actions taken by the European Central Bank to avoid 
market disruptions and two official reports by the presidents of the ECB, European Council, 
European Commission and Eurogroup (EU Council, 2012a) to lay out reforms for the euro 
area, European Union institutions’ initiatives in the service of creating a banking union have 
been mostly characterised as actions to ensure the cohesion of the single market, under the 
tools offered by the European Union Treaties Those actions have thus lacked focus on the 
market failure caused by the single currency (see the introductory part of this section). The 
current banking union framework lacks a common euro-area backstop and requires national 
bailouts as the last-resort intervention. Interest rates will thus reflect even more a bank’s 
location rather than the ECB’s monetary policy stance (Ubide, 2013). A resolution fund 
without a credible common backstop thus more closely resembles a deposit guarantee 
scheme to be used when bank resolution is likely to affect protected deposits (those of 
€100,000 or less).  
Under the single market mandate, critical steps toward a banking union, such as a credible 
common resolution/recapitalisation bank-supplied fund with a common, unlimited 
backstop and prohibition on state aid, look like an unnecessary corollary to current financial 
integration. In truth, it is harder to justify these actions under the single market umbrella 
because national banking systems outside the euro area are indeed marketing services at the 
EU-wide level, but they are acting in accordance with national monetary policy and a 
credible (sizeable and funded) backstop that is ultimately in the hands of the domestic 
government, backed by their own central bank. Keeping the backstop national in this case 
avoids indirect cession of monetary and fiscal policy sovereignty to EU institutions. An EU 
undertaking to override this defence of sovereignty via a more comprehensive backstop and 
supervisory framework at EU level might not be interpreted as a complementary act to 
national prudential supervision for the smooth functioning of the single market, thus 
violating the subsidiarity principle enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (see 
the following section).  
4.2 Some legal aspects of current EU proposals: A disorderly intervention? 
Most of the EU’s initiatives in this sphere (including the creation of new agencies) have been 
done using Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as 
legal basis (see Table 3), which allows, simply put, approximation of national laws by EU 
law if the latter does a better job in ensuring the smooth functioning of the single market. 
This legal basis has been working fine for the harmonisation of most of financial services 
legislation so far, despite earlier case law that contested its use for harmonisation in instances 
                                                   
19 See, for instance, the governance of the single resolution board within the agreement on the single 
resolution mechanism agreed by the European Council, which pushes back control on the trigger for 
the liquidation of a bank to the vote of the member states and a complex procedure (European Council 
2013). 
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where it does not necessarily remove barriers to smooth functioning of the single market, in 
line with the subsidiarity principle enshrined in Article 5 of the TEU.20 
Doubts about this legal basis arise, however, with respect to the powers that the proposed 
Single Resolution Board will have under the ‘EU agency’ framework set by Art. 114 of the 
TFEU. In particular, problems crop up with both the breadth and depth of the powers 
granted to this new agency. Regarding the latitude of these powers, the Meroni case is still 
the precedent for the creation of new agencies through secondary EU legislation.21 This case 
law limits the discretionary powers of the agency to those specifically prescribed by the 
delegator (the European Commission), prohibiting the delegation of powers that are not in 
the Commission’s remit. Decisions of these authorities thus need to follow detailed 
guidelines and requirements set by the legislation. According to the Legal Service of the 
Council of the European Union, the current legislative proposal on the creation of the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB) would grant powers that are too ambiguous and discretionary to the 
SRB in at least nine instances (Council of the European Union, 2013). More specifically, the 
Board would exercise discretionary powers in violation of the Meroni case (and so the 
‘principle of conferral’ of Art. 5 of the TEU) in defining certain aspects of the resolution plan 
and scheme (also in relation to the use of resolution tools); the individual contributions to the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the Fund’s use; and the sanctioning powers.  
Finally, as recently confirmed by the conclusions of the European Court of Justice in a case 
on short-selling regulation,22 Article 114 of the TFEU also puts a limit on the depth of these 
powers, which cannot replace those of national authorities since it would be beyond the 
harmonisation mandate provided by this legal basis. That is, the agency cannot make legally 
binding decisions overruling national authorities’ decisions. In few instances, the current 
SRM legislative proposal might run afoul of the legitimacy, whether an agency or the 
European Commission is responsible, when considering a triggering mechanism overriding 
the power of national authorities to decide when a bank should be considered “failing” and 
need to be broken up, sold or liquidated. However, it should be recognised that European 
measures are needed to promote the creation of a banking union and keep the single market 
intact. If done under a different legal basis, these measures might pass muster. Article 352 of 
the TFEU might be better placed to ensure that the Board is endowed with effective powers 
and speedier procedures to ensure that banks are swiftly wound up.  
Relying on harmonisation of rules for the single market, Art. 114 of the TFEU may thus not 
be sufficient as a legal basis to introduce a common, unlimited backstop to the bank 
resolution/recapitalisation fund, and a blanket prohibition of national state aids to domestic 
banks, that is, the elimination of the exemption granted under Article 107.3(b). As explained 
above, these two elements would round out a policy action that is for the moment only 
dealing with the moral hazard of banks, not governments. Ideally, Art. 352 of the TFEU is the 
best legal instrument under current treaties, but the creation of an entity that can properly 
                                                   
20 See the first tobacco advertising case of annulment of the Directive 98/43 for violation of the 
subsidiarity principle in Article 5 of the TEU; Case C‐376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] 
ECR  I‐8419. 
21 Case 9/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, [1958] ECR 154. 
22 See the legal opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen on United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Council of the European Union and European Parliament, Case C-270/12, delivered on 
12 September 2013, on the validity of article 28 of Regulation No. 236/2012 (short selling) and the final 
judgment of the European Court of Justice on 22 January 2014 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=146621&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=firs
t&part=1&cid=407914).  
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function as a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) may more realistically come out 
of an inter-governmental agreement, since there appears to be a lack of unanimous political 
support for making use of Art. 352 of the TFEU or drawing up a procedure for a treaty 
change. It might also turn out to be hard to compel governments to introduce a sweeping 
prohibition on state aids, as it could go against their short-term interests.  
Despite the odds, following proper legal procedures will ensure that this mechanism has the 
powers needed to impose strict conditions on banks for recapitalisation/asset relief and to 
establish a potentially unlimited backstop to support the privately funded SRF (with 
mutualisation of losses) so that it does not run out of money during acute liquidity crises. 
The funding of the SRF remains a key pending issue since it would most likely need its own 
independent bond issuance with capital injections by participating member states or access 
to a credit line at the ECB if exhausted. Either way, the SRF may also benefit from access to 
the European Stability Mechanism, especially if SRM member states manage to come to an 
inter-governmental agreement, so obviating discussions on revision of the treaties. However, 
today, ESM intervention is only allowed via government intermediation and under 
additional fiscal policy conditions together with an increase in public debt. This may cause 
responsibility for the indirect backstop to revert to national governments once more.  
Furthermore, claims that an inter-governmental agreement would not ensure a proper 
judicial review of the decisions at European level (see, in particular, Véron, 2013) might be 
not well grounded in fact. As is the case with the decisions taken by the ESM, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) can be responsible for judicial review of the newly 
constituted SRB (through inter-governmental agreement) under the joint application of 
Articles 267 and 273 of the TFEU.23 “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in any 
dispute between Member States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties if the 
dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the parties”. (Art. 273 of the 
TFEU, emphasis added) The Treaty establishing the ESM can be classified as a ‘special 
agreement’ between parties that can be subject to judicial review by the CJEU for decisions 
that involve interpretation of the treaties. If EU institutions are unable to reach an agreement 
under Art. 352 of the TFEU or to change the Treaty to set up an effective resolution 
mechanism, the inter-governmental agreement is the most realistic option currently available 
that may fall under the category of ‘special agreements’, even if it would have limited 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
Three open issues for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)  
Together with the Single Resolution Mechanism, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the 
cornerstone of the banking union, not necessarily for the power that the regulations will confer 
on the European Central Bank, which power is already indirectly exercised by the Eurosystem 
through the moral suasion of the common monetary policy framework and implementation 
guidance. The SSM defines the boundaries of authority of the Single Resolution Mechanism and 
serves as the reference point for further harmonisation of definitions (e.g., capital and loan 
provisions). 
Among other issues, such as the direct supervision that is limited to banks whose impact is 
significant enough to be deemed systemic, there are three open issues for the SSM that are 
intrinsically related to banking union and to the impact of the monetary union on its very nature: 
                                                   
23 These articles apply on top of the general clause about judicial review of decisions taken by EU 
institutions under Article 263 of the TFEU. 
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 potential conflict with non-EMU countries’ monetary policy approaches, 
 the incentive system of the Asset Quality Review (AQR) and 
 conflict of interest between the ECB’s supervisory and monetary policy functions. 
First, because the SSM will also cover some non-euro-area member states, it is of primary 
importance that the supervisory guidelines set by the ECB on the implementation of capital 
requirements do not clash with comparable monetary policy actions in non-euro-area countries. 
In particular, governments could exert political pressure on their central banks’ monetary policy 
when a disagreement that cannot be solved in the current governing bodies of the SSM emerges. 
For instance, the ECB may have a stricter interpretation of the application of capital 
requirements, which may be in conflict with an expansionary monetary policy in those non-EMU 
countries or may even affect the domestic government’s borrowing costs. This inconsistency 
could distort the implementation of ECB supervisory policies and become a potential barrier to 
the level playing field that a banking union requires. It also raises the question of whether a true 
banking union can be created with financial systems outside the boundaries of the monetary 
union.  
Second, the design of the Asset Quality Review (AQR) may have significant flaws in the 
incentives offered to banks. It is essential that banking systems comply with the best safeguards 
set by prudential regulation and by supervisory guidelines. Constant monitoring is critical to 
ensure that the banking system is well capitalised. However, while the announcement that the 
ECB will have the power of investigation and will periodically review banks’ balance sheets is 
salutary, disclosing specific information about and timelines for the review has triggered a rush 
among banks to engage in certain window-dressing exercises. In particular, with some regional 
differences linked to the general market conditions, many banks are cutting credit to firms (in 
particular to small and medium enterprises) and ending some riskier exposure to make their 
balance sheet look better, in line with regulatory capital requirements, so as to avoid public 
stigma that would ultimately increase funding costs for an undercapitalised bank. By shrinking 
in size, rather than increasing equity holdings, management also avoids the problems of equity 
dilution for current shareholders but in doing so imposes a credit crunch on bank-centric 
economies (those whose companies use loans primarily rather than equity to finance 
investments) like most countries in the European Union. Posting a public timeline for reviews, 
which should instead be done on a random basis, and ultimately publishing the full results of 
such reviews may only accentuate the perverse incentives to avoid equity dilution.  
Finally, while performing these reviews, the ECB has to contend with an internal conflict of 
interest between supervisory and monetary policy functions. It will have to answer publicly as to 
whether the AQR will aim to spot ‘zombie’ banks and seek recovery or resolution or rather will 
collect evidence to justify another round of credit easing, perhaps via another long-term 
refinancing operation. If the review process intends to serve both goals, then that should be 
clarified ex ante followed by market guidelines. The multi-faceted nature of financial stability can 
readily lead to situations where monetary policy and supervisory duties work at cross-purposes. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has provided ample evidence of the impact that the single currency has on a fully 
fledged banking union. While boosting further financial integration in the European Union 
may be a commendable objective, the harmonisation of rules for the smooth functioning of 
the single market neglects the breadth of the interventions required in the common currency 
area to deal with governments’ moral hazard driven by competition on funding (borrowing) 
costs. Current EU actions to build a banking union and reverse financial fragmentation are 
de facto postponing proper management of banks’ legacy losses, with the risk of being 
ineffective and harming the economy. While addressing or trying to address the potential 
moral hazard of banks, current solutions miss effective remedies for a similarly important 
market failure in the eurozone financial system: By putting off the legacy assets issue to the 
future, the moral hazard of governments could push the monetary union, followed by the 
EU as a whole, into a prolonged deflationary spiral, as experienced by Japan over the past 
two decades. Completing the banking union by taking into account the reforms needed for 
the single currency area is not just an empty treaty exercise, to be done whenever political 
support might emerge. Evidence shows that ‘home bias’ can lead an imperfect banking 
union to undermine citizens’ welfare in a currency union, thus threatening the stability of 
and hence political support for the euro area. To bring banking union closer to its ideal 
design, two remedies for governments’ moral hazard have been proposed in this paper: a 
credible resolution mechanism and a blanket prohibition of state aids to the financial system 
for euro-area countries. 
A credible resolution mechanism requires a sizeable and privately funded 
recapitalisation/resolution fund (with a common, unlimited backstop) that will apply strict 
conditionality to its use. The criteria will be the same (or stricter) than those that the 
European Commission tries to impose today through the distorting and unnecessary 
intermediation of governments. Without a common backstop to the fund, the resolution fund 
will simply resemble a deposit guarantee scheme with limited firepower, so pushing back to 
national governments the role of lender of last resort. Resolution will take place when no 
other viable solutions (including guarantees, asset relief and recapitalisation) can be 
pursued. The European Commission, in the meantime, will have to look for a better legal 
basis (perhaps Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) or build 
consensus around a revision of the treaties, since the current framework might violate the 
Meroni jurisprudence on delegation of powers. Once in place, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, designed and implemented properly, would help in the smooth functioning of 
credit markets and thereby avoid the harmful effects that would be caused by a self-inflicted 
credit crunch. Even if a credible (sizeable and well-funded) resolution mechanism with a 
common, unlimited backstop were to neutralise the distortions produced by individual 
member states’ intervention, a blanket prohibition of state support through the elimination 
of Article 107.3(b) of the TFEU for euro-area countries might be required in any case. In 
effect, the possibility of intervening before the recapitalisation/resolution mechanism kicked 
in would still allow for competition on borrowing costs among member states, with the 
attendant risk of capital flight from countries whose banking sectors are perceived to be less 
stable).  
Because winds of economic crisis still blow on eurozone economies, it is of the utmost 
urgency that European institutions work in a comprehensive and timely fashion to achieve a 
fully fledged banking union. The frightening prospect of a prolonged inability to deal with 
issues that exert drag on the financial system ought to serve as a goad to action, this time 
done the right way.  
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Annex 
Figure A1. Intra-EMU vs Extra-EMU claims of Spanish, French, Italian and German banks, Q2-
2010 Q2-2013 ($ mn) 
 
Note: ‘Extra EMU’ includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
Source: BIS.  
 
Figure A2. Foreign claims of domestic banks vs the rest of the world ($ mn), 2005-(Q2)2013 
  
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
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Figure A3. Foreign claims of domestic banks vs EMU counterparties ($ mn), 2005-13 
  
Source: BIS. 
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